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We study a dynamic market process in which traders condition their beliefs 
about payoff-relevant parameters on past endogenously generated market data and 
current exogenous data. We say that a market process is informative if the beliefs 
of traders who receive only endogenously generated market data converge almost 
surely to the true parameter value. Our main result is that under standard regularity 
hypotheses, the generic market process is informative. We define an equilibrium as 
the limit points of the market process. Journal of Economic Literature 
Classification Numbers: 02 1.026. c 1984 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are few general results on the statistical properties of market- 
clearing prices in economies with incomplete markets and asymmetrically 
informed traders. One result is that if the amount of private information is 
sufficiently small, then equilibrium prices typically will be sufficient statistics 
for that information (Allen 12, 31, Radner [20]). Another result is that if the 
amount of private information is sufftciently “large,” then equilibrium prices 
typically will not be sufficient (Jordan and Radner [ 181, Jordan [ 161). 
These results present several problems. When equilibrium prices are 
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sufftcient statistics, the equilibrium cannot be implemented by collecting 
information on excess demands alone. This is the content of the famous 
“Beja paradox.” (For a discussion, see Jordan and Radner 1191.) When the 
amount of private information is large, not only will prices not be sufficient, 
but the equilibrium has so far been shown to exist only with constructions 
leading to a mathematically perverse price statistic--one discontinuous on a 
dense set of signals (Jordan [ 171). This particular view of the market is not 
compelling. 
We believe these implementation and existence problems arise because 
static Walrasian models are ill-suited to the study of statistical properties of 
equilibrium. Prices have too much to do when statistical inference and 
market clearing occur simultaneously. 
In our view, markets evolve over time as traders condition their behavior 
on past endogenously generated market data and current exogenous data. 
Traders rationally use whatever information they have. However, if they 
were able to extract information from current endogenous data, the process 
which implements market equilibria would require revelation of entire excess 
demand functions. Rather than require the existence of institutions that 
accomplish this revelation, we find it more natural to assume that institutions 
preclude conditioning behavior on current equilibrium data. 
We model the dynamic market process as a recursive system. Our 
rationality hypothesis is that traders make correct use of exogenous data and 
predetermined market data. Just as current market data may not be sufficient 
for current private information (Jordan [ 16]), past market data may not be 
sufficient for past private information. Sufficiency, however, is only an 
optimality property of a statistic. Past market data may contain useful infor- 
mation without being sufficient for past private information. Estimates of 
payoff-relevant parameters from endogenously generated market data may 
ultimately be just as accurate as parameter estimates from exogenous data. 
We use the tools of statistical decision theory to characterize the limit 
behavior of the stochastic market process. We say that a market process is 
informative if the beliefs of traders who do not receive exogenous infor- 
mation about payoff-relevant parameters converge almost surely to certain 
knowledge of the true parameter value. In other words, a market process is 
informative if Bayes estimates (from market data alone) of the payoff- 
relevant parameters are, in the language of statistical decision theory, 
consistent. Our main result is that under standard regularity hypotheses, the 
generic market process is informative. 
Learning behavior in our model can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium 
in learning strategies, as in Townsend [22]. Thus the model presented here 
can be described as a rational learning model, in stark contrast to our earlier, 
boundedly rational model of learning behavior (Blume and Easley 191). A 
class of examples exploiting similar decision theoretic tools has been 
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discussed by Bray and Kreps [ 111. Recursive sequential equilibrium models 
have recently been studied by Hellwig [ 141. 
The model is presented in Section 2, and general dynamics are treated in 
Section 3. Limiting behavior is discussed in Section 4. The informativeness of 
the sequence of market data is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 contains the 
proof of our major theorem. Summaries and conjectures are collected in 
Section 7. 
2. THE MODEL 
Our intent is to construct the simplest possible model to illustrate our 
alternative concept of rational expectations equilibrium. In our model each 
generation of traders lives for one period in which they purchase and 
consume a bundle of goods. The utility value of these bundles is random and 
unknown ex ante to some traders, the uninformed, and is known to others, 
the informed. The parameters describing the utility of the bundles are 
distributed according to one of a finite number of distributions. Uninformed 
traders want to learn which distribution the values come from. Thus an unin- 
formed trader born in period t uses public market data from previous 
periods, which reflects to some extent the information of past informed 
traders. to estimate which distribution is correct. We identify conditions 
under which Bayes estimates, from market data, of the parameter indexing 
distributions are consistent. 
We study a sequence of temporary equilibria for an exchange economy 
with L perishable goods. Let (I,.,., i ,..., 1} denote the set of trader types. All 
traders have consumption set RL, + , and traders of type i have an endowment 
in each period of wi E R: + .’ Also given is a set S c R” of payoff-relevant 
parameters where S is a compact set with non-empty interior. In each period 
the single trader of each type selects a consumption bundle to maximize his 
expected utility. Utility satisfies the following assumptions: 
A.l. ui: R”,, x S -+ R i is C* with the usual boundary condition that 
for all s E S closures in RL of level sets do not intersect the boundary of 
RL- 
A.2. For all (x, s) E R: + x S, DXui(x, s) E RL, +, and 
D:u;(x, s) E RL’ is negative definite. 
It follows that for any Bore1 probability measure on S, expected utility is C* 
on Rt,, satisfies the boundary condition of A.l, and satisfies A.2. 
’ Rt + = (.Y E RL: xj > 0 for all j). We use Cp, p > 0, as an abbreviation for CP(Rm, R”), 
the set of p times continuously differentiable functions from Rm to R”, when Rm and R” are 
unambiguous. For a function fE C’(R”‘, R ‘), Ds(x) denotes the m-vector of first partial 
derivatives ofSand D*j”(x) denotes the m x rn matix of second partial derivatives ofJ 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM 119 
The parameter s E S at time t comes from the realization of an i.i.d. 
stochastic process { sl} ;“= , . The distribution of S, is unknown, but each trader 
correctly believes it to be contained in the set (,D,: 0 E 0) where each ,ue is a 
Bore1 probability measure on S and 0 is a set of parameters. 
A.3 The cardinality 10 1 of 0 is finite. 
Any trader of type i starts with prior pi on 0 and then given his infor- 
mation he uses Bayes rule to compute a posterior. As 0 is finite, beliefs at 
time t can be represented by vectors pi, = @,,(@),,a in the non-negative unit 
simplex A’@‘-‘. No trader could learn that 8 E 0 is true if he believes it to be 
impossible a priori, so we assume: 
A.4 For all i, pi(B) > 0 for all 8 E 0. 
Let E denote the set of all vectors e = (u,,..., u,) of utility functions 
satisfying A.1 and A.2. A sequence (en)?=, converges to limit e if and only 
if for all i the maps u~,,(x, s), Dxuin(x, s), and Dzuin(x,s) all converge 
uniformly to ui(x, s), DXui(x, s), and D:u,(x, s), respectively. Evidently if a 
sequence (e,}F= i converges to limit e in this sense, then for any vector of 
probability distributions (ui ,..., o,) on S, the corresponding sequence 
(j b(x, 4 4 ,..., J uln(x, s) do,) of expected utility functions converges in 
the topology of uniform Cz convergence on compact subsets of R$ + to 
(j u,(x, s) do, ,..-. 1 u,(x, S) do,).* This fact will be used without comment in 
the sequel. 
In Section 5 we fix the endowment allocation and prove that certain 
statements are generic. This is to say that certain statements hold on open 
and dense sets of E. 
3. DYNAMICS 
At time t one trader of each type is born. As each trader lives for only one 
period, his objective is to maximize the expected utility of his consumption at 
t. Trader types i = l,..., I, are informed of the value of S, in each period t. 
These informed traders ignore market data as it contains no additional infor- 
mation. Trader types i = I, + I,..., I are not informed of the value of any s,. 
Hence, at t an uninformed trader of type i uses past market data to revise his 
prior pi to a posterior pi,. 
At time t the informed trader of type i solves the maximization problem 
s.t.p, . (Xi, - Wi) < 0, Xir E RL, 4 
* This follows immediately by differentiating under the integral. 
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where pt denotes a price vector in the unit simplex AL -I. It is a standard 
exercise to show that the excess demand for informed trader i is a C’ 
function zi: AL-’ x S -+ RL-’ satisfying all the usual conditions necessary 
for equilibrium analysis. 
At time t the uninformed trader of type i solves the maximization problem 
MAX I’ ui(xit , s,) duir 
S.I. pt * (Xi, - Wi) < 0, xi, E R’; + 
where uit is the posterior predicted distribution of s, given trader i’s obser- 
vations. The posterior predicted distribution of s1 is easily derivable from 
trader i’s posterior beliefs about 8. The posterior beliefs of i are a vector 
pi, E A’@‘-’ so 
It is a standard exercise to show that excess demand for uninformed trader i 
in period t is a C’ function zi: AL-’ X Al”‘-’ + R’ -’ which satisfies all the 
usual conditions necessary for equilibrium analysis. 
Let d= JJ:=,,+ I A’@‘-‘. Aggregate excess demand at time t is 
z:AL-’ xdx S+RL-’ 
defined as 
Z(P,P,,+* T.... &,s)= 2 
, 
Z&P, s) + \‘ Zi(P, Pi>. 
ikl I;rl 
It is straightforward to guarantee that equilibrium always exists and that 




The dynamics of the market process are determined by the evolution of 
posterior beliefs once we specify how prices are actually determined. 
Naturally the particular equilibrium price vector which emerges from the set 
of all possible market clearing prices will be determined by the institutions 
which implement market processes. We suppose only that price deter- 
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mination can be represented as a measurable selection f from the correspon- 
dence F. A measurable selection always exists (Hildenbrand [ 151) and our 
results are independent of the selection chosen. 
Thus dynamics for our model will be completely specified once we specify 
the information structure. We assume that uninformed traders observe only 
publically available past market data and that this data is only market 
prices.3 In order to simplify notation we denote this information by M rather 
than by AL-‘. 
Let M, = X,“= 1 M. Let a, denote u-field of Bore1 measurable events 
in M, that are observable at or before time t; i.e., A En?, iff 
A = B xX::,+, M, where B is measurable in Xi_, M. Let II?, = I’:=, A,. 
Then (a,):, is a sequence of o-fields adapted to I@, on M, . Uninformed 
traders at time t condition on events in a,-, . This is the recursion 
assumption. Uninformed traders only condition on predetermined 
endogenous variables. (In period 1, uninformed traders use their prior 
predicted distributions.) 
We say that the stochastic process of market data is informative if unin- 
formed traders can ultimately learn the true 0. 
DEFINITION 1. The stochastic process of market data {p,},“=, is infor- 
mative if for each i = I, + l,..., Z lim,,, E{pi(0)]fi,} = 1 a.s. when the true 
parameter is 8. 
Note that the distribution of the process { pl)l”, , can be derived by 
substituting back through f and the Bayes revision rules. This process is very 
complicated. For example, typically it will not be Markov. Nonetheless the 
limit behavior of this process can be characterized because it is driven by 
conditional expectations, to which Martingale theory can be applied. 
The dynamics of the market process are as follows. First, the new 
informed traders receive observations of the payoff-relevant parameters. 
Next, the new uninformed traders revise the prior for their type based on 
past market data. Then trade occurs. Finally, each trader consumes and dies. 
Then the process repeats itself with a new generation of traders. 
4. THE LIMIT ECONOMY 
The process of market prices is driven by the expectations formation 
mechanism. Thus suppose # is the true parameter value, and that A is an 
event in a,. Then 
PrB(A)=Pre(f(P,,+l,,,...,P,,,,s,):=,EB}, WhereA =B XXZ,+,M. 
’ If the information set contains more than market prices any results guaranteeing 
convergence of beliefs to certain knowledge of the relevant parameter value will still hold. 
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In principle this can be computed in a straightforward manner from ,~s and 
the Bayesian updating formulae. Our assumption that uninformed traders are 
Bayesians is in effect an assumption that they all know Pr, for each 8 E 0. 
Consider an uninformed trader of type i with prior probability distribution 
pi and let 0” denote the a-field of measurable events in 0. (We have assumed 
that 0 is finite, so 0’ is the power set of 0. But this discussion is fairly 
general. For example, it suffices to require that (0, 0”) be a complete 
seperable metric space.) Then trader i’s beliefs give rise to a probability 
measure on the measurable space (0 x fi,, a(& x k,)) defined as the 
extension of 
Pr,(A XB) =J Pr, (A} dpi 
B 
for A E .&?,, B E 0”. (Of course when 0 is not finite, the measurability of the 
map I!- Pr,(A) is required, but this is easy to show.) Then the posterior 
probability trader i assigns to event B E 0” at time t is 
where a,-, is the product of i@-, and the trivial a-field (0, O), and the 
expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution Pri.4 The 
sequence of u-fields (ML”= i is increasing, and so the sequence of conditional 
expectations {E{ l,,,IM,}}z, is a uniformly bounded Martingale. Thus the 
Martingale convergence theorem applies. The sequence of random variables 
WB,MI~tlE, converges almost surely to a Vz i at-measurable limit 
random variable, which is the limit posterior probability of the event B E 6. 
It is an easy exercise to extend this in the following manner: 
Define the period t posterior distribution for traders of type i by 
P,(B) =W,xd’%,I+ 
Then p, is a random variable whose values are probability distributions on 
(0, 0”). This sequence of random variables converges almost surely in the 
topology of weak convergence to a VE, tit-measurable limit random 
variable whose values are probability distributions. 
To sum up, let P(0, 0’) denote the set of all probability measures on the 
measurable space (0,8), with the topology of weak convergence. Posterior 
distributions are P(0, @-valued random variables. 
THEOREM 1. Let (/Ii,};“= 1 be type i’s sequence of posterior beliefs. Then 
there exists a P(0, 6)-valued variable pioo such that lim,,, pi, = pioo a.s. ,u~. 
Pro05 See Appendix. 
’ 1, takes the value 1 on E and 0 elsewhere. 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQULIBRIUM 123 
Let Q = XFY i S be the space of sequences of signals drawn from S and let 
Q be the o-field on Q. The sequence of random variables { @,, + l+l,..., /3,,,)},“, 
is defined on (Q, Q), where q E Q is drawn according to the i.i.d. process 
whose one-dimensional distribution is pe, and converges almost surely to 
(P I,+l,m,...,/?l+co). Since market data in any period depends only on the 
informed’s signal in that period and the expectations that uninformed traders 
hold when they enter the market and since expectations converge almost 
surely, there is a sense in which market data converges. Let d be the metric 
on M x M. 
LEMMA 1. Inf{d(p,,y,):y, E F(PIl+l,m,.-.~P,,m, st)J conuews to 0 
almost surely. 
Proof. The correspondence F is non-empty and compact valued, so 
infP(p,~y,): Y, E WIl+, mr--~~P,,~o, fs )} is well defined. Choose a point 
q E Q such that {/3,,‘+,,, ,..., ,f3,.,},“=, converges. Then inf(d(p,,y,): 
Y,-vII,l mdL I 
hemi-continuity of F. 
s )} converges to 0 as a consequence of the upper 
Q.E.D. 
Since convergence of expectations is an event in the tail o-field of the 
equilibrium price process, it is necessary to characterize the limit behavior of 
equilibrium prices. Lemma 1 provides a useful characterization. The 
sequence {p,)E, is informative if traders learn the true 8 with probability 1, 
and so a sequence (p*},“, of random variables is informative if with 
probability 1 a trader can tell from which distribution 13 was drawn. In the 
next section this is done by studying the limit sets of prices identified in 
Lemma 1. When uninformed traders’ expectations converge to the vector 
(P fi+l,,,,...,/?t,co) they all know this limit vector as they all use the Bayesian 
updating formula and they all start with positive prior probability on every 
8. Then almost surely the only possible limit sets of data are those that arise 
from the i.i.d. stochastic process ,u~ 0 f -‘(PI,+ I,cc ,..., p,,,). If this process is 
informative, then, as the process of market data converges to this process, 
uninformed traders will be able to learn 8. 
~.INFORMATION CONTAINED IN MARKET DATA 
Now we look at the information carried by the stochastic process of 
market prices (p,};O=,. In effect, uninformed traders at time t use {p,}::: in 
an attempt to learn 8. The following theorem gives conditions under which 
Bayes estimates of t9 from this data are consistent. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose A.I-A.4 are satisfied. There exists a residual set 
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of economies C c E such that for each e E C there exists an open and dense 
set of vectors of measures in IIeee P(S, s) such that for any (+a1 ,..., ,u, 8 ,) in 
this set prices are informative for the economy. 
6. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 
The proof of this theorem involves applying the techniques of static 
rational expectations analysis to the limit economy which is, as we have 
seen, an i.i.d. stochastic process. If Bayes estimates of B from the limit price 
process are consistent for each possible specification of limit posteriors for 
the uninformed traders, then limit beliefs are correct. (This follows because 
convergence of Bayes estimates of 19 from prices is a property of the tail u- 
field, and we have seen that on the tail a-field the stochastic price process 
agrees almost surely with one of the limit i.i.d. processes described in 
Section 4.) 
Suppose that the limit i.i.d. process has distribution o,@) when the 
parameter is 13 and the limit vector of beliefs is ,l?E d. Then 8 can be 
estimated consistently if and only if the o,(p) distributions are all different 
(Doob [ 121, Schwartz [21]). If f: A x s+ ALP ’ is the selection from the 
equilibrium price correspondence, then 
This is to say, o,@) is the distribution under ,ue of the random variable 
f(‘& .): S -+ AL-‘. 
In order to prove our results for all possible selections from the 
equilibrium correspondence it will be necessary to work directly with 
distributions of the equilibrium correspondence. Define 
p o F-‘(8, .) = (p 0 f -‘(p, .):f is a measurable selection from F}. 
LEMMA 2. If F: dx S + AL-’ is u.h.c., then the correspondence 
r: P(S, 3) x d+ P(AL-l,d”L-l), defined such that r(u, ,L?) =p 0 F-‘@, .), is 
u.h.c. 
Proof Blume [ 7, Theorem 3.11. 
We first show that for all e E E, the set of measures 
cu lr.YP,e,) E neeew $1 such that Z$s,j?)nr&OC,j?)=O for all PEd 
and 6 # 8’ is open. If this is true the property that prices are informative is 
open. 
LEMMA 3. The set of all measures @,,...,,q8,) E IIeeeP(S, 9) such that 
U,,,rCus,P)nrCu,,,P)=rztfor all 020’ is open. 
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Proof. It suffices to establish the lemma for any pair t9 # 13’. Define 
/1:P(S,S)~dxP(dL-‘,~~-‘)suchthatIIOI)={~,~oo~’~,.)):pEd). 
It follows from Lemma 2 and the compactness of P(dL- ‘, J’- ‘) that /i is 
u.h.c. Note that UBEhr’@i, b) f7 rbz, lir> = 0 is true if and only if li &i) n 
/1@J = 0. Now the AQi) are compact sets (since /i is u.h.c. and 
dx P@l-‘, J’- ‘) is compact) and so there exists open sets Ai 3 Agi) such 
that A I n A, = 0. Let Ni = {p: A(,u) c Ai}. Since ,4 is u.h.c. each Ni is open, 
and if @i,pJENi XN,J@,)fM@,)=0. Q.E.D. 
The only thing left to prove is the density statement in Theorem 2. We 
first show that if the measures (p,: BE 0) have finite, sufficiently large, 
disjoint supports, then the limit sets described in Lemma 2 are disjoint. If 
this is the case, the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium price sequence 
clearly identifies 8. We then use this result to establish that prices in the limit 
economy will reveal 13 for a dense set of measures in fleGeP(S, 3) for any 
member of a residual set of economies. 
Let k be an arbitrary integer greater than (I- I,)(1 0 ( - l)/(L - l), and 
let (s:,..., ) sLe’ be any k 101 different vectors from S. Suppose that p, has for 
its support the first k vectors, ,uz the second k vectors, etc. Then supp ,u, n 
supppu,, = 0 for B = 8’. Define sf,..., sf to be the vectors in supp p,. Let ,L? 
denote the limit beliefs of the uniformed. A necessary condition for any two 
different parameters 8 and 8’ to be indistinguishable in the limit economy is 
that there exists a permutation rc of the integrers l,..., k such that 
(1) 
Z(4k, it $3 = 0 
PI-q41=0 
Pk - qk = O. 
Call the left-hand side of this equation H(p, ,..., pk, q1 ,..., qk, p). Then 
H: nf:lAL-l x&R 7-  3k(L-1). It is easy to see that H is a differentiable 
map. If (1) has a solution, then it is possible to select from F so that 
supp,Uu of-‘@ *)= supp,B,, of+@, .). 
LEMMA 4. I f  k > (I - I,)(\ 01 - l)/(L - l), then there exists an open 
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and dense set of economies E(s: ,..., sLe’) c E such that (1) has no solution 
for any permutation x, any 8, 13’ E 0, and any DE 2. 
ProoJ The idea is to use Allen’s [ 1 ] idea of log-linear perturbations of 
traders’ utility functions. Consider trader 1, an informed observer. Define the 
smooth function 6 *i: S-+R for i= 1 ,..., k and 8 E 0 such that ?jei(sy) = sBi 
and P(s:‘) = 0 for i #j or 8 # 8’. Let a:‘,..., aFi be real numbers such that 
Cf=, a:‘< 1. Let a = (a:‘,..., a;“‘“) and E = (8” ,..., &‘*lk). Now consider, for 
trader i, 
This utility function satisfies A.1 and A.2, and has the effect of introducing a 
different log-linear perturbation for each se. Our method now follows Allen 
[ l] and Radner 1201. Define, in the obvious way, H(p, q, /?, a). Computing, 
where A and B are k(L - 1) x k(L - 1) matrices representing the derivatives 
Dpz(P7 p9 sZ(i)> and D,z(p,p, se’), respectively; A” and B” are 
k(L - 1) x (I-I,)(101 - 1) matrices representing derivatives with respect to 
p, and A’ and B’ are k(L - 1) x kL matrices representing derivatives with 
respect to the aFi and ayi’, respectively. The key fact, due to Allen [ 11, is 
that A’ and B’ are surjective. This implies the surjectivity of DH, and so 
H fi {O}. The solution set has codimension 3k(L - l), and so it is a manifold 
of dimension 2k(L-l)+(Z-Z,)(jOI-1)+2kL-3k(L-l)=(Z-I,) 
(I 01 - 1) - k(L - 1) + 2kl. The 2kL corresponds to the a perturbations. If 
k > (I-I,)(101 - l)/(L - l), then the dimension is less than 2kL. Thus the 
projection of the solution set onto the space of a perturbations is lower 
dimensional. This establishes density of the economies for which (1) has no 
solution for any /?, and openness is obvious. Intersecting open and dense sets 
over a finite number of permutations rr and a finite number of pairs 6 # 8’ 
leaves an open and dense set, which proves the lemma. Q.E.D. 
To complete the proof of the theorem we need only construct a dense set 
of measures in fleea P(S, 9) like those of Lemma 3. Let D(k) denote a 
countable and dense set of vectors {(s: ,.,., sLe’) E n,“ly’ S: se # ST’ for i #j 
or r9# S’}. From Lemma 4, (si ,..., sA”> e D(k) implies E(s: ,..., si@‘) is open 
and dense if k is sufficiently large. Define 
E(k) = n E(s; ,..., s;@‘). 
(s;,...,sjp’Wk) 
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This set is residual. Let C = nk>r E(k) where k = (I- I,)(] 0 ] - lj/(L - 1). 
This set is residual, and for any economy e E C and limit beliefs p the limit 
economy has distinct i.i.d. price distributions for each 8 E 0 when the 
parametrization (pe: 8 E O} is such that (supp ,ui,..., supp p,,,) E D(k) for 
any k sufficiently large. This set of such parametrizations is dense in 
neEeP(S, 3) (Billingsley [6]), and this completes the proof of the theorem. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In a world where market institutions preclude traders from conditioning 
their expectations on current endogenous market data, past market data may 
contain useful information. Uninformed traders may use it to infer something 
that the informed know or are learning. The model we have constructed was 
designed to illustrate our alternative approach to rational expectations 
equilibria in the simplest possible context. Our model can clearly be enriched 
to include other phenomena and stronger theorems may be found with a 
deeper probabilistic analysis of the sample paths of market data. 
In particular, our method of analysis can be used to ask whether or not 
the uninformed can learn the true structural model. Suppose 0 is a parameter 
describing some aspect of the informed payoffs which is also relevant for the 
uninformed as it enters the structural model. Then our analysis would be 
applied to give conditions under which the uninformed could learn 19. The 
technique is to show that in the limit economy prices identify 19 for an open 
and dense set of economies (i.e., perturb the informed trader’s payoffs for 
values of 8, rather than for values of s) and then argue, as in the text, that 
since the limit o-field identifies 0, market data is informative. Bray and 
Kreps [ 111 provide a closely related analysis of this problem. 
The other problem suggested by our analysis lies in the nature of the inter- 
temporal link. In our model the only connection between different dates is 
the dependence of posterior beliefs upon past observations. In particular we 
allow no durable goods, no savings, and no money. If these phenomena are 
allowed, the limit economy becomes much harder to characterize and so our 
methods may not suffice. One possibility, though, is to find conditions which 
give rise to turnpike properties of equilibrium. Steady-state savings or 
consumption plans may tie down the limit economy sufficiently for our 
methods to succeed. Recent work by Bewley [5] may provide guidance in 
this direction. 
There is a more important question suggested by our results. The least 
appealing aspect of our definition of rationality is the amount of knowledge 
we require of each trader. A theory of market evolution which requires all 
traders to have full knowledge of the structure of the economy is at least 
imperfect, if not misguided. In a trivial sense we can allow for learning about 
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the structure of the economy, but this only pushes the common knowledge 
assumption one level deeper. At some level the structure must be fixed, 
exactly as the space of types is known to all players in Harsanyi’s [ 131 
theory of games of incomplete information. The obvious question is. To what 
extent can this assumption be relaxed? The negative results of Blume and 
Easley [9] suggest what can happen when traders arbitrarily misspecify the 
likelihood function for market data. 
We leave the reader to choose between two conflicting interpretations of 
our results. First, our Theorem 2 provides a basis for belief in rational expec- 
tations equilibria in the long run, because the structrure of the economy can 
be learned by Bayesians from endogenous market data. Second, the 
hypotheses of our Theorem 2 are unbearably strong, but the alternative is the 
negative results of our earlier paper, and so there is no reason to believe that 
market forces drive the economy to a rational expectations equilibrium. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1. Define pu,(B) =E( l,,,,, ]M,} for all B E 0”. So 
defined, pI is a probability measure on the measurable space (0,o’). Since 
is an indicator function, supI,!?{ l,,,z/M,} < 1 a.s., so the sequence 
;,k%, is a square-integrable martingale. From the martingale 
convergence theorem, the limit random variable ,uu,(B) = lim,,, pu,(B) exists 
almost surely. Since (0, 0”) is Polish, there exists a countable collection of 
sets (Bj}j”_, which form a convergence-determining class for the topology of 
weak convergence on (0, 0’) (see [6, p. 141). As {Bj}]Y, is countable there 
exists a set N of full measure such that on N the sequences (p,(B,j)}c, all 
converge simultaneously. Thus pu, is a probability measure and, on N, p, 
converges to ,u, in the topology of weak convergence. Q.E.D. 
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